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segunda-feira, 29 de outubro de 2007
TACV Vai Ligar Bissau a Lisboa
sexta-feira, 26 de outubro de 2007
domingo, 7 de outubro de 2007
A PROPÓSITO DOS VOSSOS COMENTÁRIOS QUE NÃO CHEGAM AO BLOG:
Finalmente recebi mais um comentário. Acho que é apenas o segundo, desde que criamos o nosso bog. Até agora eu só tenho recebido e-mails falando das postagens, por isso estou feliz por este comentário.
A minha felicidade tem a ver com o facto de eu pretender que este seja um blog partilhado, no qual toda a gente comenta e opina. Como eu disse no início deste blog, as postagens que eu coloco destinam-se apenas a ser um ponto de partida para discussões sobre as temáticas de eleição deste blog; desenvolvimento, ODM, Anti-corrupção, governança, etc,
Por isso me caiu tão bem este comentário. Não tem a ver directamente com as temáticas que se pretende discutir, (redução da pobreza , desenvolvimento, etc ) , mas poderá até ter muito a ver. Este comentário concentra-se na questão da língua e da não publicação de artigos em português. Eis o comentário e eis também a minha modesta resposta. Temos finalmente, por onde começar os nossos “ djumbais”. O meu agradecimento ao “anónimo” que quis perder algum do seu tempo lendo este nosso blog.
O COMENTÁRIO :
Anônimo deixou um novo comentário sobre a sua postagem "Guinée-Bissau : Narco-Etat... le risque est réel !...":
for Helder Vaz
the wonderful citizens of your country may also be interested in particular articles in portuguese. Related to your english posting on corruption, see for instance this one: http://www.portugaldiario.iol
A RESPOSTA / Dialogando:
You are right my dear friend. But I’ am here positively, only to share and no more. Definitely no more. As I use to receive the alert notifications daily in English and French, by e-mail, I use to post them at our blog as they are, without comments , just to provide information and to help and guide less informed colleagues to find the resources for their work. As you know , in
Anyway , my colleagues I am trying to provide some information here, are much more fluent in English and French then me. Unfortunately most of the “ wonderful citizens of my country “ have no access to the internet services, energy, water and sanitation, etc. The reality is that even if they might or “may also be interested in particular articles in Portuguese”, it will not be easy for them to read my blog. Thus my target is different and smaller and my purposes are to help some professionals in
“Myth #2: Governance and corruption cannot be measured. It is true that less than a dozen years ago virtually no internationally comparable measures of governance or corruption existed. But in recent years, the World Bank and others have sought to remedy this. At the World Bank, we have constructed aggregate governance indicators that cover more than 200 countries, based on more than 350 variables obtained from dozens of institutions worldwide. Our indicators cover the following six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of major violence and terror; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption.
While the indicators represent a big step forward, there are measurement challenges. Margins of error are not trivial, and caution in interpreting the results is warranted—one should not precisely rank countries. But these margins of error have declined, and are now substantially lower than for any individual measure of corruption, governance, or the investment climate. As a result, the World Bank’s governance indicators are used worldwide for monitoring performance, for country assessments, and for research.”
Portugal Diário :
“Segundo Kaufman, governação e corrupção não podem ser mensurados. Mas o Banco Mundial reuniu em base de dados indicadores de governação de mais de 200 países, constituidos por mais de 350 variáveis obtidos por dezenas de instituições por todo o mundo.”
ANY COMMENTS …?
Anyway I appreciate your kind and useful comment, and I must thank you for your interest and very wise and important guidance. ESTAMOS JUNTOS!
E AGORA DESCULPEM , MAS HOJE VOU DORMIR CEDO PORQUE, AFINAL, EU TAMBÉM SOU FILHO DE DEUS.Um domingo feliz para todos e para cada um de vós.
sábado, 6 de outubro de 2007
ZHONGXIANG ZHANG : China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective
| China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective | |
| September 2006 | |
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Abstract:
China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns have sparked China's interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in China's view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. In this context, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. However, China's oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western capitals. Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing's ties to the so-called rogue states undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or punishing these states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect human rights.
This paper argues that China's hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. That said, the paper suggests that, in pursuing its oil diplomacy, Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the international community. The paper points out that devoting more resources to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. This way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and helps to enhance China's security of energy supply and at the same time would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. Overall, it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China.
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China’s Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective
ZhongXiang Zhang, Ph.D in Economics
Senior Fellow
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601,
USA
Tel: +1-808-944 7265 Fax: +1-808-944 7298
Email: ZhangZ@EastWestCenter.org
In the last couple years, the Chinese government has been making serious overtures to African countries in order to obtain contracts for fuel supply. There have been numerous media reports on this issue. But in my view, China’s hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. To put this issue into perspective, let me first put China’s overall energy demand and supply in context because these factors are often overlooked in discussing the issue.
China is indeed a large energy consumer. In the mean time, China has also become a large producer. Currently, domestic supply provides about 94% of the total energy consumption in China, meaning that the overall energy dependence (namely, the ratio of the energy that a country imports to the total it consumes) is about 6%. In the future, China will continue to rely mainly on domestic supply to meet its growing energy demand. With a variety of policies and investments that have been made and continue to be made to further expand domestic supply capacity, domestic, conventional energy is estimated to supply 2400 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) by 2020 (Zhang, 2005).
During the current five-year period running from 2006 to 2010, the Chinese government has set a goal of cutting energy use per unit of its gross domestic product by 20%. The government has also established medium to long term energy conservation plan to keep the country’s total energy demand below 3000 million tce in 2020 (NDRC, 2004). This suggests that domestic supply will meet 80% of the total energy consumption. Even if energy demand goes up to 3600 million tce in the worst case scenario as some analysts suggest, China’s domestic supply is still able to provide two-thirds of the total energy demand in 2020. This makes China different from other larger energy-using countries like Japan that imports over 80% of its total energy consumption.
That said, this by no means questions the increased importance of China’s growing oil imports. China was traditionally self-sufficient in oil, but since 1993 has been a net oil importer. China’s economic boom and stagnated supply of domestic oil have produced
the growing hunger for foreign oil. As of 2003, China emerged second only behind the U.S. in terms of oil imports. At present, China imports over 40% of its oil consumption and this is expected to rise to 60% or more by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). Energy security has risen to the height of importance in its foreign policy, and is becoming what has been called a “transforming” factor in the relations between China and the Middle East, Russia, and energy-rich Central Asian, African and Latin American countries (Yi, 2005).
China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns have sparked China’s interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in China’s view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. Given their closeness and accessibility through pipelines, China has been keen to invest in Central Asian and Russian oil field development projects and in the construction of pipelines in order to bring oil from these regions. In the meantime, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. In the meantime, China’s oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western capitals (Eisenman and Stewart, 2005). Critics accused China of fueling conflicts and human-rights violations in Africa by selling arms to some repressive regimes in exchange for oil and minerals (Bezlova, 2006).
Beijing has been building goodwill by strengthening bilateral trade agreements, awarding aid and forgiving national debt. For example, China voluntarily waived US$ 1.2 billion in sovereign African debt in 2000 when the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was formed to promote trade and investment with 44 African countries (Kitissou, 2005). To date, Beijing has given more than US$ 5.5 billion in assistance and canceled the debt of 31 African countries (Masaki, 2006). Beijing has helped to build the railroad network in Nigeria, main roads in Rwanda, as well as bridges, stadiums and harbours. In accompanying this, China has forged closer economic relations with Africa. Bilateral trade between China and Africa hit a record of US$ 40 billion in 2005, up 35% from 2004. Given that African-Japanese trade totaled US$ 18 billion in 2005, China is outdoing Japan, the world’s second largest economy (Masaki, 2006).
In recent years, the top Chinese leaders frequently paid the visits to oil-producing countries. This goodwill-based energy diplomacy has helped China to make remarkable inroads in striking energy deals with oil-rich African countries in the Gulf of Guinea, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Niger, and Sudan. The Chinese oil companies’ overseas investments not only mitigate China’s own concern about oil security by obtaining equity oil overseas. For example, Sudan is China’s largest overseas oil production base, and more than half of the country’s oil exports go to China, which accounts for about 5% of China’s total oil imports. Now, Angola has become China’s second largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia, and Africa as a whole provides over a quarter of the Chinese oil imports (British Petroleum, 2006; Xinhua News Agency, 2006). The Chinese oil companies’ investments also help these African developing countries to raise their standards of living.
For example, China’s assistance has helped to turn Sudan into an oil-exporting country. Moreover, Chinese investments in oil fields in African countries help to pump more oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil on the world market. The new addition to the markets may help to prevent oil prices rising even higher.
Certainly, other Asian countries could follow suit. In my view, this will not affect the relationship between Chinese companies and their African counterparts, given China’s long-established friendship with African countries and the championing of their interests, not to mention mutually, commercially benefits. But this will affect the price of China’s oil acquisitions. China has already competed with Japan for oil and gas fields in Russia and Central Asia. At present, there is no direct competition between China and Japan for African oil resources, largely because Japan has almost ignored Africa as a source of its badly needed oil. This may change in the future, because Japan has stepped up its Africa diplomacy in recent years. While China aggressively pursuing oil and gas interests in Africa plays a part, this has been mainly promoted by a strong desire for Japan to gain support from the continent’s 53 countries for its bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat (Masaki, 2006). While cooperating with each other occasionally (In the first instance of Sino-Indian cooperation, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) won a joint bid in December 2004 to buy PetroCanada’s 37% stake in Syrian oilfields for US$ 573 million. India and China also work together in Sudan, where CNPC operates the Greater Nile oilfield, in which ONGC has a 25% stake (Aiyar, 2006).), China and India already compete for energy resources in Africa as well as in other regions.
The Chinese oil companies have a history of overpaying for equity positions (Balfour, 2002). Because China has viewed paying a higher price than competitors to secure energy resources to be more of a national security issue than the absolute price itself (Bradsher, 2005), such bidding wars between Chinese companies and Indian rivalries have further intensified the tendency of Chinese oil companies paying far above what other competitors offer. To date, India has been losing out in every deal that both China and India have been shooting for. But China has grabbed these deals by overbidding at least 10% more than its competitor India has bided. In January 2006, the China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) bought a 45% stake in the Akpo offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria for US$ 2.27 billion by outbidding the competitor, ONGC that submitted a bid of US$ 2 billion but withdrew after India’s cabinet raised concerns about the risks involved (Aiyar, 2006; Masaki, 2006). In August 2005, CNPC paid US$4.18 billion to acquire Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan, making it China’s largest foreign acquisition ever (Bradsher, 2005). Originally, CNPC offered US$ 3.6 billion. With the Indian consortium’s (ONGC-Mittal) bid of US$ 3.8 billion, CNPC hiked its offer to US$4.18 billion to grab this deal (Basu, 2005). However, it is important to note that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy. CNOOC failed to acquire Unocal for US$ 18.5 billion, although it topped Chevron’s bid of US$ 16.4 billion. But, in the end, Chevron grabbed the deal.
It should be pointed out that China’s oil diplomacy has its own price. Critics have increasingly labeled China’s relations with oil-producing countries as the oil ties. In their
views, China’s growing ties with Africa are purely for oil, and as long as it helps the country to secure oil deals, China is willing to exchange political, financial and military favors without regard to transparency, development and stability in Africa. To put it simply, critics accused China of mixing business with politics in pursuit of its economic gains in Africa. However, it is important to note that while China appears quite willing to get oil from wherever it can, this does not mean that China would not invest elsewhere, say, in less “roguish” nations, if it had the option. Under economic rationale, no country would prefer to invest in an unstable regime over investment in a more stable one. However, China’s options are limited.
Partly because the Western powers have gained control over best oil fields available, as a late entrant to the international oil game, China has little choice but to strike deals with the so-called rogue states, which are identified by the U.S., to secure oil supplies. Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing’s ties to these countries undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or punishing rogue states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect human rights (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Wu and Shen, 2006). Although it is unlikely to bring the two countries in direct confrontation, China’s practice of oil diplomacy is widely perceived in Washington as attempts to threaten U.S. security interests because Beijing strikes deals either with rogue states that Washington has tried to marginalize or in America’s backyard which Washington perceives as its turf and within its traditional sphere of influence (The U.S. has long regarded Central and South America as part of its backyard, and Canada as an extension of its front porch. Washington perceives that recent forays by Beijing into the Western Hemisphere, which are part of Beijing’s global search for large supplies of oil-based energy, are challenging its influence. Beijing’s search has recently taken to Venezuela and Canada, which together provide about 25% of U.S. oil imports. The anti-American President of Venezuela has spoken of a desire to reduce its dependence on the U.S. market (Richardson, 2005). Beijing and Ottawa have concluded a series of energy and resources agreements, providing for greater Chinese involvement in developing Canada’s natural gas sector, its vast oil sands deposits and its uranium sector. This could create tensions between Beijing and Washington as well as between Washington and Ottawa, because U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2001 national energy policy report emphasizes the importance of Canada’s tar sands to U.S. energy security (Zweig and Bi, 2005).). Thus, China should be very cautious in pursuing this type of oil diplomacy. Let me make this point clear. I am not suggesting that Beijing stance should be swayed by Washington. What I am suggesting is that Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the international community.
Beijing aggressively pursuing this type of oil diplomacy without proper consideration of the international community’s concern may benefit China in the short-term, but may hurt it in the longer term, reducing its future benefits. China has achieved its own rise and close to being integrated into the global economy and norms. Given that China will not possess large scale oceangoing naval capabilities in the near future, it must depend on the global economy and norms. Thus, it is in China’s own long-term interest to support the stability of the international regimes. For the time being, Beijing should think deeply
about how to be more nuanced in responding to the concerns and perceptions of Washington and Brussels instead of just repeating nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states as its guiding principle of foreign policy. Perhaps devoting more resources to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. In my view, this way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. In the meantime, it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This viewpoint has been motivated by an interview with Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations, Harvard University. It has benefited from useful comments from Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen. That said, the views expressed here are those of the author. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and omissions that may remain.
REFERENCES
| Keywords: China, Oil hunt in Africa, Energy polcy |
IFC: Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference
Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference
The result: Only 18 percent of small businesses are run by women in the DRC. Next door, in Rwanda, which has no such regulations, women run more than 41 percent of small businesses.
Doing Business 2008 finds that large emerging markets are reforming fast, with the potential to benefit hundreds of millions of people. Egypt, China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam all improved in the ease of doing business.
Doing Business is about studying obstacles to equal opportunity, and this year it began to look at this issue as it affects women. Initial findings indicate that higher rankings on the ease of doing business are associated with higher percentages of women among entrepreneurs and employees. Greater regulatory reform has especially large benefits for women, who often face regulations that may be aimed at protecting them but are counterproductive in effect, forcing them into the informal sector. There women have little job security and few social benefits.
The Doing Business project has committed to a two-year research program on reforms that improve the job and business opportunities for women.
Hitting the road
Doing Business does a simple but powerful thing: it systematically and objectively measures the time and cost involved in setting up, running, and closing a business in 178 countries around the world. With the publishing of the new report, the Doing Business team kicks off its annual road show visiting dozens of countries—and may be coming to a place near you.
Visit the Web site for more information on the project, to order copies of Doing Business 2008, and to generate your own reports using the latest Doing Business data: www.doingbusiness.org.
About Doing Business
A high ranking on the ease of doing business means that a government has created a regulatory environment conducive to operating a business, yet the rankings do not tell the whole story. They do not account for other factors such as the quality of infrastructure services, macroeconomic policy, proximity to large markets, or law and order.
A joint IFC-World Bank product, Doing Business is based on the efforts of more than 5,000 local experts around the world—business consultants, lawyers, accountants, government officials, and leading academics—who provide empirical input and methodological support and review.
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Let's have a deeper discussion on aid
About this Talk
After four days of intense discussion on aid versus trade at TEDGlobal 2007, it was up to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Finance Minister of Nigeria, to sum it up. She asks, first, for the discussion to continue, and for it to grow more sophisticated, more nuanced. And she shares a gripping story that puts the aid-versus-trade debate into true human terms.
Speakers Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Economic reformer
As the first female Finance Minister in Nigeria, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala attacked corruption to make the country more desirable for foreign investment and job creation.
Why you should listen to her:
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, was Nigeria's Finance Minister and then briefly Foreign Affairs Minister from 2003 to 2006, the first woman to hold either position.
During her tenure, she worked to combat corruption, make Nigeria's finances more transparent, and institute reforms to make the nation's economy more hospitable to foreign investment. The government unlinked its budget from the price of oil, its main export, to lessen perennial cashflow crises, and got oil companies to publish how much they pay the government.
Since 2003 -- when watchdog group Transparency International rated Nigeria "the most corrupt place on Earth" -- the nation has made headway recovering stolen assets and jailing hundreds of people engaged in international Internet 419 scams. Okonjo-Iweala is a former World Bank vice president who graduated from Harvard and earned a Ph.D. in regional economics and development at MIT. Her son Uzodinma Iweala is the celebrated young author of Beasts of No Nation. "Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a heroine not just of Nigeria, but of the entire continent. Her crusade against corruption has put her life at risk." The Independent (UK)
Menos corrupção colocaria Portugal ao nível da Finlândia
Menos corrupção colocaria Portugal ao nível da Finlândia
Estudo do Banco Mundial mostra que países podem triplicar rendimento per capita. E diminuir mortalidade infantil. Corrupção prejudica famílias mais pobres com impostos injustos e cria a necessidade de «subornos» nos serviços públicosMAIS:
«Dez mitos sobre a governação e corrupção» aponta o caminho para o desenvolvimento. E garante que a diminuição da corrupção poderia pôr Portugal na senda do desenvolvimento, ao mesmo nível da Finlândia.
Daniel Kaufmann, director dos Programas Globais do Instituto do Banco Mundial, apresenta esta tese num artigo publicado na revista trimestral do Fundo Monetário Internacional, «Finance and Development», também divulgada na internet.
O estudo do Banco Mundial estima que um país que melhore a sua governação e que parta de um baixo nível pode alcançar uma bom termo de desenvolvimento e triplicar o rendimento per capita da população. As melhorias, segundo Kaufman, vão mais longe e afectam ainda a redução da mortalidade infantil assim como a iliteracia.
Essa melhoria corresponderia a subida no nosso ranking em questões de «controlo e corrupção» na base de dados do Banco de Portugal, subindo Portugal ao nível da Filândia, Guiné Equatorial ao nível do Uganda que, por sua vez, alcançaria a Lituânia que, chegaria ao rendimento de Portugal.
O texto, intitulado «Dez mitos sobre governação e corrupção», aborda várias questões, nomeadamente o impacto da governação no desenvolvimento. No estudo, o responsável do Banco Mundial mostra que em geral os países podem extrair enormes dividendos do desenvolvimento e da melhoria da governação.
Segundo Kaufman, governação e corrupção não podem ser mensurados. Mas o Banco Mundial reuniu em base de dados indicadores de governação de mais de 200 países, constituidos por mais de 350 variáveis obtidos por dezenas de instituições por todo o mundo.
No caso de corrupção, em países em desenvolvimento, a corrupção acaba por resultar numa desproporção para as famílias com menores rendimentos: pagam mais impostos do que deveriam, e parte dos seus rendimentos são gastos em «subornos» para terem acesso aos serviços públicos. Numa estimativa, as transações mundiais são «manchadas» pela corrupção em perto de um trilião de dólares.
Sociedade :TATIANA de Luanda, Finalista do 2º Big Brother Africa
October , 2007
Name: Richard Age: 24 Birthday: August 10 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Ilala Height: 1.77m Occupation: Student
Name: Tatiana Age: 26 Birthday: March 31 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Luanda Height: 1.76m Occupation: Actress/model
Name: Bertha Age: 28 Birthday: June 2 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Harare Height: 1.65m Occupation: Lawyer/PR and Communication Consultant
Bertha spent a year in the USA as an exchange student when she was 16 and says the experience taught her to appreciate and love her home country. “I was an ambassador, a student, and a teacher. I had to learn about my people and teach others about my heritage. That changed my view of Zimbabwe and of Africa….then began my love affair with my continent.”
Name: Code Age: 31 Birthday: June 2 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Blantyre Height: 1.74m Occupation: Broadcaster
Malawian radio personality and music man Code would love to visit Paris, likes weight lifting sometimes, enjoys reading music magazines, loves nature and wants to meet Al Gore because of Gore’s role in the Global Warming Campaign. He says that the best advice he ever got was from his father who told him to “brush your teeth and keep your breath fresh all the time.”
Name: Kwaku Age: 30 Birthday: June 1 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Kumawu Height: 1.77m Occupation: Self Employed (Entertainment Consultant, Brand Architect, Artist)
Ghana’s Kwaku says that it’s in the interest of DStv audiences to watch him on Big Brother Africa 2 because he’ll “keep them entertained.” He also says that he wanted to be on Big Brother Africa 2 because he felt he “had the winning qualities required.” A fan of Ghana’s Black Stars and self motivating literature, he says that if he could spend one day with someone famous, he’d pick Jay Z for a few simple reasons. “I admire his creativity and believe we are like-minded individuals
Name: Maureen Age: 27 Birthday: September 5 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Entebbe Height: 1.65m Occupation: Fashion Designer
Describing herself as playful, naughty and silly sometimes, Maureen says that going to India to study changed her life. She says that graduating from college in India was her best achievement because “the culture is so different from mine.”
Name: OfunnekaAge: 29 Birthday: August 9 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Jos, Plateau Height: 1.6m Occupation: Personal Assistant to Medical Director
Nigerian Big Brother Africa 2 housemate Ofunnekama is a 29-year-old Lagos resident who holds a BSC degree in Chemistry. The straight talking Ofunnekama says that the event that changed her life was the recent end of a relationship which she describes as “an eye opening experience
Mining : Tokyo Sexwale Investing in Cameroon
Mvelaphanda Holdings to assess mining and energy in Cameroon
Mvelaphanda Holdings will send a team to Cameroon today to assess mining and energy opportunities in the country.
Bloomberg, 21 Set 2007Mvelaphanda Holdings, controlled by former South African politician Tokyo Sexwale, will send a team to Cameroon today (subs:Friday) to assess mining and energy opportunities in the country. The company will focus on seeking opportunities in natural gas, gold and iron ore, Sexwale told reporters in Yaounde, Cameroon's capital, on Wednesday, after meeting Cameroonian Prime Minister Ephraim Nyoni."We are interested in investing in this country," he said.
Thabo Mbeki and Tokyo Sexwale: Have the two men really settled their past differences?
Thabo Mbeki and Tokyo Sexwale
Have the two men really settled their past differences?
James Myburgh 23 Mai 2007Tokyo Sexwale has been presented as a ‘compromise candidate' for the presidency of the African National Congress. The claim is made that he is someone able to appeal to both camps. This requires remaining on reasonable terms with both President Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, while manoeuvring for the top job. Earlier this week the editor of Business Day, Peter Bruce, even suggested that Sexwale and Mbeki could even make a double play. "Two good and (economically) like-minded leaders combining to get what they each want? Mbeki gets Tokyo's support to lead the party again. Mbeki backs Tokyo to become head of state."
Sexwale though has reason to resent Mbeki, and consequently Mbeki has cause to fear and distrust Sexwale's ultimate intentions towards him. Most famously, in April 2001 the Sunday Times reported that the Safety and Security Minister, Steve Tshwete, had told them that the police had, since the previous year, been investigating claims that Mbeki was "in ‘physical danger' from high profile leaders within the ANC who are plotting to oust him." A couple of days later Tshwete went on to national television and named Sexwale, Cyril Ramaphosa, and Mathews Phosa, as the individuals supposedly involved in the plot.
According to Bruce, and others, Mbeki and Sexwale have since "made up". Indeed, Sexwale was apparently recently seen entertaining Mbeki in Franschhoek. Yet, it would be surprising if all had been forgiven and forgotten, for the bad blood between the two men goes back a long way.
After becoming premier of Gauteng in 1994 Sexwale did little to disguise his ambitions, and he used his high public profile to position himself to challenge for the presidency. In May 1995 Africa Confidential claimed that then Deputy President Mbeki's office had allegedly issued a directive to SABC head, Zwelakhe Sisulu, requesting that Sexwale get less television coverage.
"The directive" it reported, "said that other provincial premiers had complained about their lack of national coverage: equally lowering Sexwale's profile will not do Mbeki any harm. Sexwale's aides say they expect a quiet few months, but afterwards the premier will be more demonstrative about his presidential aspirations."
Then in September 1996 Newton Kanhema, a journalist close to Sexwale, revealed in the Saturday Star that Mbeki had approached F.W. de Klerk shortly after the 1994 elections and asked him if any documents or evidence existed in state files concerning the involvement of Sexwale in alleged drug-dealing or other criminal activities.
In August 1994 Sexwale had written a letter of complaint to De Klerk, which he had copied to President Mandela. In it he stated, "I wish to draw your attention to a matter that has been brought to the attention of my office, which supposedly originates from your office - from your person in particular. The matter in question relates to a false allegation purportedly from yourself, directed to a senior member of the Government to the effect that some people, including myself, maybe be involved in criminal acts such as drug peddling." (Saturday Star 14th September 1996)
Subsequently, Sexwale met with De Klerk on the 30th September 1994. The conversation was recorded and Sexwale was given a tape of the discussion. In the meeting De Klerk told Sexwale that: "I had a discussion with a businessman and we were talking about the person who is likely to succeed Mandela. When the businessman suggested your name I said I doubted it because there were long knives out for you. I can assure you that this knife is not mine."
De Klerk also told Sexwale that at Mandela's presidential inauguration Mbeki came to him, "and said there were suspicions that you were involved in drugs. He said the ANC had information pointing in that direction. I have never heard any rumour about you... we would have used it against you during the election. I contacted intelligence and they gave me a paper which did not warrant anything being done and I gave that to Mr Mbeki." (Sunday Independent 15th September 1996)
After these reports broke the then Safety and Security Minister, Sidney Mufamadi, stated that he had discussed the allegations with Mbeki back in 1994. He had then approached the commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe, to see whether any light could be shed on the matter. Van der Merwe told him the police were aware of the allegations but that they could not be substantiated. "They were not aware of anything beyond allegations. No one had given them information that was sufficient grounds to launch an investigation." (Citizen 16th September 1996)
Kanhema reported shortly afterwards that, according to his sources on the ANC's national executive committee, there was a "perception among some" that Mbeki had gone "hunting for anything that could damage Sexwale's image, lest he became a strong contender for the presidency of the party." He further claimed that Sexwale was "bitter" because he believed he had "been betrayed by Mbeki and Mufamadi, who ‘threw him to the wolves' [De Klerk and Van der Merwe] to dredge up information on drug dealing."
A couple of months later there was yet further reason for discord between the two men. In an interview with the press in November 1996 Mandela described the idea that he had already chosen Mbeki as his successor as a misconception, as it was the NEC or conference that had the power to choose the party's president. This anodyne comment caused a brief fuss after Mandela briefed the NEC on the content of the interview.
An anonymous source told Kanhema that Mandela had told the NEC, "There has been a perception that I have already chosen my successor. There is talk that comrade Mbeki is the heir apparent but all this is not true. I have not chosen anyone to take over. The whole matter is in the hands of congress." The source further claimed that, "Everyone was shocked. I saw everyone with their heads down. We did not expect this, the race is on, but you can expect to see more people who are possible candidates being sidelined." The Star headlined Kanhema's report: "Mandela drops Mbeki bombshell: I have no heir apparent to the presidency, Madiba tells stunned ANC leaders" (11th November 1996).
This interpretation was vigorously denied by both Mandela's office and the ANC. The New Nation fingered Sexwale as the source of the leak, speculating that he "may have had a hand" in the report in The Star. It claimed that "rumours implicating Sexwale remain strong in the party" and this had "tarnished his image". "It is believed" the newspaper reported, "that the organisation is determined to censure anyone found guilty of leaking the distorted interpretation of Mandela's attitude towards the race for the leadership of the organisation." The Hogarth column in the Sunday Times also claimed: "Although they have no proof, ANC insiders all point to Sexwale as the man who twisted Mandela's words."
After Sexwale announced his decision to quit active politics in the middle of 1997 the Mail & Guardian reported that the "ambitious premier" committed a "tactical error when he went one-on-one against Mbeki." The critical turning point came, it said, when he "he went to the press with the allegations against Mbeki" on the drug-trafficking issue in September the previous year. The article claimed that his opponents in the ANC regarded Sexwale "as a leader with much style but little substance. He was never regarded as one of the great political thinkers in the ANC." Sexwale meanwhile "believes he is a victim of Mbeki's intolerance of rivals within the party." He had also often expressed doubt to his inner circle that Mbeki was up to the job of running the country, telling them that "the president's [Mandela] shoes are huge and Thabo has tiny feet."
It could well be that the rough treatment Sexwale has received at the hands of the Mbeki-ites, including two police investigations, is by now just water under the bridge for him. Equally, he might just be following an astute political strategy. As Niccolò Machiavelli observed, it is foolish and imprudent to demand a thing from someone, and to say beforehand that once handed over it will be used to harm them. Rather, one should disguise one's intentions, while endeavouring "to obtain one's desires anyhow. For it is enough to ask a man to give up his arms, without telling him that you intend killing him with them; after you have the arms in hand, then you can do your will with them."
Daniel Kaufmann: 10 Myths About Governance and Corruption
A quarterly magazine of the IMF | September 2005, Volume 42, Number 3 |
Governance—which remains a sensitive and misunderstood topic—is now being given a higher priority in development circles. A few donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) have begun to work with some emerging economies to help reduce corruption, and encourage citizen voice, gender equality, and accountability. When the Group of Eight countries announced in July their decision to double aid and debt relief to the poorest countries in Africa, governance concerns were prominent. And in May, the joint report by the Africa Commission explicitly stated: "Good governance is the key... Unless there are improvements in capacity, accountability, and reducing corruption... other reforms will have only limited impact."
But is good governance and controlling corruption really so fundamental for development? The explosion of empirical research over the past decade, coupled with lessons from countries’ own experience, have given us a more solid basis for judging the effect of governance on development, and the effectiveness—or lack thereof—of strategies to improve it. Yet there are still unresolved questions and debates in the development community, not only about the importance of governance, but also about the ability of IFIs to help countries improve on it. Let us therefore go back to basics and address some prevailing "myths" about governance and corruption.
Myth #1: Governance and anticorruption are one and the same. We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension). By contrast, corruption is defined more narrowly as the "abuse of public office for private gain."
Myth #2: Governance and corruption cannot be measured. It is true that less than a dozen years ago virtually no internationally comparable measures of governance or corruption existed. But in recent years, the World Bank and others have sought to remedy this. At the World Bank, we have constructed aggregate governance indicators that cover more than 200 countries, based on more than 350 variables obtained from dozens of institutions worldwide. Our indicators cover the following six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of major violence and terror; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption.
While the indicators represent a big step forward, there are measurement challenges. Margins of error are not trivial, and caution in interpreting the results is warranted—one should not precisely rank countries. But these margins of error have declined, and are now substantially lower than for any individual measure of corruption, governance, or the investment climate. As a result, the World Bank’s governance indicators are used worldwide for monitoring performance, for country assessments, and for research.
Myth #3: The importance of governance and anti-corruption is overrated. Thanks to these and other advances in empirical measurement, a number of researchers have examined the impact of governance on development. The research generally shows that countries can derive a very large "development dividend" from better governance. We estimate that a country that improves its governance from a relatively low level to an average level could almost triple the income per capita of its population in the long term, and similarly reduce infant mortality and illiteracy. Such a relative improvement (by one standard deviation) would correspond, for instance, to a move up in our ranking for the "control of corruption" dimension in our database, taking Equatorial Guinea to the level of Uganda, Uganda to Lithuania, Lithuania to Portugal, and Portugal to Finland.
Governance also matters for a country’s competitiveness and for income distribution. In the case of corruption, research suggests it is equivalent to a major tax on foreign investors. In many developing countries, corruption represents a "regressive tax" on the household sector as well: lower income families pay a disproportionate share of their incomes in bribes to have access to public services (compared with higher income groups), and often end up with less access to such services because of corruption. A rough estimate of the extent of annual worldwide transactions that are tainted by corruption puts it close to $1 trillion.
To make matters worse, aid-funded projects tend to fail in corrupt settings. And corruption undermines fledgling democracies. Of course, governance is not the only thing that matters for development. Macroeconomic, trade, and sectoral policies are also important. But when governance is poor, policymaking in other areas is also compromised.
Myth #4: Governance is a luxury that only rich countries can afford. Some claim that the link between governance and incomes does not mean that better governance boosts incomes, but the reverse—higher incomes automatically translate into better governance. However, our research does not support this claim. It is thus misleading to suggest that corruption is due to low incomes, and invent a rationale for discounting bad governance in poor countries. In fact, the evidence points to the causality being in the direction of better governance leading to higher economic growth. A number of emerging economies, including the Baltics, Botswana, Chile, and Slovenia, have shown that it is possible to reach high standards of governance without yet having joined the ranks of wealthy nations.
Myth #5: It takes generations for governance to improve. While it is true that institutions often change only gradually, in some countries there has been a sharp improvement in the short term. This defies the view that while governance may deteriorate quickly, improvements are always slow and incremental. For instance, there has been a significant improvement since 1996 in the "voice and accountability" indicator in countries ranging from Bosnia, Croatia, and Ghana, to Indonesia, Serbia, and Sierra Leone. And the improvements exhibited by some African countries in a short period of time challenge the "Afro-pessimists." Even so, it is sobering that, on average, there has not been a worldwide improvement in overall governance during this period—and in a number of countries, including the Ivory Coast, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, there has been a sharp deterioration.
Myth #6: Donors can "ringfence" projects in highly corrupt countries and sectors. With the possible exception of some humanitarian aid projects, the notion that the aid community can insulate projects from an overall corrupt environment in a country is not borne out by the evidence. The data suggest that when a systemic approach to governance, civil liberties, rule of law, and control of corruption is absent, the likelihood of an aid-funded project being successful is greatly reduced.
Myth #7: Fight corruption by fighting corruption. A fallacy promoted by some in the field of anticorruption, and at times also by the international community, is that one "fights corruption by fighting corruption"—through yet another anticorruption campaign, the creation of more "commissions" and ethics agencies, and the incessant drafting of new laws, decrees, and codes of conduct. Overall, such initiatives appear to have little impact, and are often politically expedient ways of reacting to pressures to do something about corruption, substituting for the need for fundamental and systemic governance reforms.
Myth # 8: The culprit is the public sector in developing countries. A common fallacy is to focus solely on the failings of the public sector. The reality is much more complex, since powerful private interests often exert undue influence in shaping public policy, institutions, and state legislation. In extreme cases, "oligarchs" capture state institutions. And many multinational corporations still bribe abroad, undermining public governance in emerging economies. There are also weaknesses in the nongovernmental sector. Further, traditional public sector management interventions have not worked because they have focused on technocratic "fixes," often done through technical assistance importing hardware, organizational templates, and experts from rich countries.
Myth #9: There is little countries can do to improve governance. Given the long list of interventions that have not worked, as well as the role often ascribed to historical and cultural factors in explaining governance, it is easy to fall into the pessimist camp. That would be a mistake. First, historical and cultural factors are far from deterministic—witness, for instance, the diverging paths in terms of governance of neighboring countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America, the Korean peninsula, the transition economies of Eastern Europe, and in Southern Africa. Second, there are strategies that offer particular promise. The coupling of progress on improving voice and participation—including through freedom of expression and women’s rights—with transparency reforms (see box) can be particularly effective.
| Toward a transparency reform scorecard The data suggest that transparency helps improve governance and reduce corruption—essential ingredients for better development and faster economic growth. But there is a need for the development aid community to pay more attention to the issue. For that reason, at the World Bank Institute we have begun to construct an index to help make transparency more transparent. Further, in terms of reforms, a basic checklist, which countries may use for self-assessment, includes:
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Myth #10: There is not much the IFIs can do. Some development experts are skeptical about the ability of IFIs and donors to help countries improve their governance—either because of a conviction that "the ‘macro’ matters more," a mistaken belief in historical "determinism," or a view that the interventions needed to improve governance are politically sensitive and thus difficult for outsiders to encourage. Surely, there are areas that fall outside the mandate of IFIs, such as promotion of fair multiparty elections. But initiatives to encourage transparency, freedom of information and an independent media, participatory anticorruption programs led by the country, and gender equality—all of which have been underemphasized so far in the fight against corruption—may well be within the ability of IFIs and donors to do something about. Such initiatives, complemented by supporting targeted reform of highly vulnerable institutions (which often include procurement, tax, customs, or the judiciary) offer much promise.
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The challenge of governance and anticorruption confronting the world today strongly argues against the "business-as-usual" modus operandi. A bolder approach is needed, and collective responsibility at the global level is called for. The rich world must not only deliver on its aid and trade liberalization promises, it must also lead by example. OECD countries should ratify and effectively implement the 2003 UN convention against corruption, and take steps (as Switzerland is starting to do) to repatriate assets looted and stashed abroad by corrupt officials. And transnational corporations should refrain from bribery and support improving governance practices in host countries. As for the IFIs and donors, there is a need to grapple with questions of selectivity and effectiveness in aid programs, anchoring aid decisions within a governance prism and helping countries build capacity to effectively absorb aid. Improving transparency will be key. Finally, countries themselves must take the lead in improving governance.
References:
Bellver, Ana, and Daniel Kaufmann, 2005, "Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (forthcoming) (Washington) http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
Commission for Africa Report, 2005, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa (London) http://www.commissionforafrica.org
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2005, "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3237 (Washington) http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html
Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003, "Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy," Global Competitiveness Report 2002–03, World Economic Forum, Geneva http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/ rethink_gov.html
World Bank Institute, 2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development (Washington).
