ZHONGXIANG ZHANG : China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective

China's Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective
ZHONGXIANG ZHANG East-West Center - Research Program September 2006
Abstract: China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns have sparked China's interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in China's view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. In this context, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. However, China's oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western capitals. Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing's ties to the so-called rogue states undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or punishing these states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect human rights. This paper argues that China's hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. That said, the paper suggests that, in pursuing its oil diplomacy, Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the international community. The paper points out that devoting more resources to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. This way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and helps to enhance China's security of energy supply and at the same time would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. Overall, it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China.
China’s Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective ZhongXiang Zhang, Ph.D in Economics Senior Fellow East-West Center 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, HI 96848-1601, USA Tel: +1-808-944 7265 Fax: +1-808-944 7298 Email: ZhangZ@EastWestCenter.org In the last couple years, the Chinese government has been making serious overtures to African countries in order to obtain contracts for fuel supply. There have been numerous media reports on this issue. But in my view, China’s hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. To put this issue into perspective, let me first put China’s overall energy demand and supply in context because these factors are often overlooked in discussing the issue. China is indeed a large energy consumer. In the mean time, China has also become a large producer. Currently, domestic supply provides about 94% of the total energy consumption in China, meaning that the overall energy dependence (namely, the ratio of the energy that a country imports to the total it consumes) is about 6%. In the future, China will continue to rely mainly on domestic supply to meet its growing energy demand. With a variety of policies and investments that have been made and continue to be made to further expand domestic supply capacity, domestic, conventional energy is estimated to supply 2400 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). During the current five-year period running from 2006 to 2010, the Chinese government has set a goal of cutting energy use per unit of its gross domestic product by 20%. The government has also established medium to long term energy conservation plan to keep the country’s total energy demand below 3000 million tce in 2020 (NDRC, 2004). This suggests that domestic supply will meet 80% of the total energy consumption. Even if energy demand goes up to 3600 million tce in the worst case scenario as some analysts suggest, China’s domestic supply is still able to provide two-thirds of the total energy demand in 2020. This makes China different from other larger energy-using countries like Japan that imports over 80% of its total energy consumption. That said, this by no means questions the increased importance of China’s growing oil imports. China was traditionally self-sufficient in oil, but since 1993 has been a net oil importer. China’s economic boom and stagnated supply of domestic oil have produced the growing hunger for foreign oil. As of 2003, China emerged second only behind the U.S. in terms of oil imports. At present, China imports over 40% of its oil consumption and this is expected to rise to 60% or more by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). Energy security has risen to the height of importance in its foreign policy, and is becoming what has been called a “transforming” factor in the relations between China and the Middle East, Russia, and energy-rich Central Asian, African and Latin American countries (Yi, 2005). China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns have sparked China’s interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in China’s view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. Given their closeness and accessibility through pipelines, China has been keen to invest in Central Asian and Russian oil field development projects and in the construction of pipelines in order to bring oil from these regions. In the meantime, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. In the meantime, China’s oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western capitals (Eisenman and Stewart, 2005). Critics accused China of fueling conflicts and human-rights violations in Africa by selling arms to some repressive regimes in exchange for oil and minerals (Bezlova, 2006). Beijing has been building goodwill by strengthening bilateral trade agreements, awarding aid and forgiving national debt. For example, China voluntarily waived US$ 1.2 billion in sovereign African debt in 2000 when the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was formed to promote trade and investment with 44 African countries (Kitissou, 2005). To date, Beijing has given more than US$ 5.5 billion in assistance and canceled the debt of 31 African countries (Masaki, 2006). Beijing has helped to build the railroad network in Nigeria, main roads in Rwanda, as well as bridges, stadiums and harbours. In accompanying this, China has forged closer economic relations with Africa. Bilateral trade between China and Africa hit a record of US$ 40 billion in 2005, up 35% from 2004. Given that African-Japanese trade totaled US$ 18 billion in 2005, China is outdoing Japan, the world’s second largest economy (Masaki, 2006). In recent years, the top Chinese leaders frequently paid the visits to oil-producing countries. This goodwill-based energy diplomacy has helped China to make remarkable inroads in striking energy deals with oil-rich African countries in the Gulf of Guinea, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Niger, and Sudan. The Chinese oil companies’ overseas investments not only mitigate China’s own concern about oil security by obtaining equity oil overseas. For example, Sudan is China’s largest overseas oil production base, and more than half of the country’s oil exports go to China, which accounts for about 5% of China’s total oil imports. Now, Angola has become China’s second largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia, and Africa as a whole provides over a quarter of the Chinese oil imports (British Petroleum, 2006; Xinhua News Agency, 2006). The Chinese oil companies’ investments also help these African developing countries to raise their standards of living. For example, China’s assistance has helped to turn Sudan into an oil-exporting country. Moreover, Chinese investments in oil fields in African countries help to pump more oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil on the world market. The new addition to the markets may help to prevent oil prices rising even higher. Certainly, other Asian countries could follow suit. In my view, this will not affect the relationship between Chinese companies and their African counterparts, given China’s long-established friendship with African countries and the championing of their interests, not to mention mutually, commercially benefits. But this will affect the price of China’s oil acquisitions. China has already competed with Japan for oil and gas fields in Russia and Central Asia. At present, there is no direct competition between China and Japan for African oil resources, largely because Japan has almost ignored Africa as a source of its badly needed oil. This may change in the future, because Japan has stepped up its Africa diplomacy in recent years. While China aggressively pursuing oil and gas interests in Africa plays a part, this has been mainly promoted by a strong desire for Japan to gain support from the continent’s 53 countries for its bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat (Masaki, 2006). While cooperating with each other occasionally (In the first instance of Sino-Indian cooperation, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) won a joint bid in December 2004 to buy PetroCanada’s 37% stake in Syrian oilfields for US$ 573 million. India and China also work together in Sudan, where CNPC operates the Greater Nile oilfield, in which ONGC has a 25% stake (Aiyar, 2006).), China and India already compete for energy resources in Africa as well as in other regions. The Chinese oil companies have a history of overpaying for equity positions (Balfour, 2002). Because China has viewed paying a higher price than competitors to secure energy resources to be more of a national security issue than the absolute price itself (Bradsher, 2005), such bidding wars between Chinese companies and Indian rivalries have further intensified the tendency of Chinese oil companies paying far above what other competitors offer. To date, India has been losing out in every deal that both China and India have been shooting for. But China has grabbed these deals by overbidding at least 10% more than its competitor India has bided. In January 2006, the China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) bought a 45% stake in the Akpo offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria for US$ 2.27 billion by outbidding the competitor, ONGC that submitted a bid of US$ 2 billion but withdrew after India’s cabinet raised concerns about the risks involved (Aiyar, 2006; Masaki, 2006). In August 2005, CNPC paid US$4.18 billion to acquire Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan, making it China’s largest foreign acquisition ever (Bradsher, 2005). Originally, CNPC offered US$ 3.6 billion. With the Indian consortium’s (ONGC-Mittal) bid of US$ 3.8 billion, CNPC hiked its offer to US$4.18 billion to grab this deal (Basu, 2005). However, it is important to note that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy. CNOOC failed to acquire Unocal for US$ 18.5 billion, although it topped Chevron’s bid of US$ 16.4 billion. But, in the end, Chevron grabbed the deal. It should be pointed out that China’s oil diplomacy has its own price. Critics have increasingly labeled China’s relations with oil-producing countries as the oil ties. In their views, China’s growing ties with Africa are purely for oil, and as long as it helps the country to secure oil deals, China is willing to exchange political, financial and military favors without regard to transparency, development and stability in Africa. To put it simply, critics accused China of mixing business with politics in pursuit of its economic gains in Africa. However, it is important to note that while China appears quite willing to get oil from wherever it can, this does not mean that China would not invest elsewhere, say, in less “roguish” nations, if it had the option. Under economic rationale, no country would prefer to invest in an unstable regime over investment in a more stable one. However, China’s options are limited. Partly because the Western powers have gained control over best oil fields available, as a late entrant to the international oil game, China has little choice but to strike deals with the so-called rogue states, which are identified by the U.S., to secure oil supplies. Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing’s ties to these countries undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or punishing rogue states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect human rights (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Wu and Shen, 2006). Although it is unlikely to bring the two countries in direct confrontation, China’s practice of oil diplomacy is widely perceived in Washington as attempts to threaten U.S. security interests because Beijing strikes deals either with rogue states that Washington has tried to marginalize or in America’s backyard which Washington perceives as its turf and within its traditional sphere of influence (The U.S. has long regarded Central and South America as part of its backyard, and Canada as an extension of its front porch. Washington perceives that recent forays by Beijing into the Western Hemisphere, which are part of Beijing’s global search for large supplies of oil-based energy, are challenging its influence. Beijing’s search has recently taken to Venezuela and Canada, which together provide about 25% of U.S. oil imports. The anti-American President of Venezuela has spoken of a desire to reduce its dependence on the U.S. market (Richardson, 2005). Beijing and Ottawa have concluded a series of energy and resources agreements, providing for greater Chinese involvement in developing Canada’s natural gas sector, its vast oil sands deposits and its uranium sector. This could create tensions between Beijing and Washington as well as between Washington and Ottawa, because U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2001 national energy policy report emphasizes the importance of Canada’s tar sands to U.S. energy security (Zweig and Bi, 2005).). Thus, China should be very cautious in pursuing this type of oil diplomacy. Let me make this point clear. I am not suggesting that Beijing stance should be swayed by Washington. What I am suggesting is that Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the international community. Beijing aggressively pursuing this type of oil diplomacy without proper consideration of the international community’s concern may benefit China in the short-term, but may hurt it in the longer term, reducing its future benefits. China has achieved its own rise and close to being integrated into the global economy and norms. Given that China will not possess large scale oceangoing naval capabilities in the near future, it must depend on the global economy and norms. Thus, it is in China’s own long-term interest to support the stability of the international regimes. For the time being, Beijing should think deeply about how to be more nuanced in responding to the concerns and perceptions of Washington and Brussels instead of just repeating nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states as its guiding principle of foreign policy. Perhaps devoting more resources to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. In my view, this way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. In the meantime, it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This viewpoint has been motivated by an interview with Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations, Harvard University. It has benefited from useful comments from Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen. That said, the views expressed here are those of the author. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and omissions that may remain. REFERENCES Aiyar, P. (2006), No ‘Great Game’ between India and China, Asia Times, January 13, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HA13Cb01.html. Balfour, F. (2002), A Global Shopping Spree for the Chinese: Mainland Companies Are Snapping Up More Overseas Assets, Business Week, 18 November, Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_46/b3808162.htm. Basu, I. (2005), India Discreet, China Bold in Oil Hunt, Asia Times, September 29, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI29Df01.html. Bezlova, A. (2006), China’s Soft-Power Diplomacy in Africa, Asia Times, June 23, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF23Ad01.html. Bradsher, K. (2005), Chinese Company to Buy Kazakh Oil Interests for $4 Billion, The New York Times, August 22. British Petroleum (2006), Statistical Review of World Energy, London. Eisenman, J. and D. Stewart (2005), China-Japan Oil Rivalry Spills into Africa, Asia Times, November 17, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GK17Ad01.html. Kitissou, M. (2005), China and Africa: A Case in ‘Petro Politics’, Center for Global Studies Bulletin, George Mason University, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 9-10. Masaki, H. (2006), Japan Takes on China in Africa, Asia Times, August 15, Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HH15Dh01.html. NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission, 2004), China Medium and Long Term Energy Conservation Plan, Beijing, November. Pala, C. (2006), China Pays Dearly for Kazakhstan Oil, The New York Times, March 17. Richardson, M. (2005), Oil-Seeking China Steps on U.S. Toes, New Zealand Herald, February 14, Available at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c_id=2&ObjectID=10010884. Wu, L. and Q. Shen (2006), Will China Go to War over Oil?, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 169, No. 3, pp. 38-40. Xinhua News Agency (2006), China OGP, Beijing. Yi, X. (2005), Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Understanding China’s ‘Peaceful Development’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 74-112. Zhang, Z.X. (2005), Sustainable Energy Development in China: Challenges Ahead to 2020, The Keynote Address at the International Conference on “Staying Ahead of the Energy Scenarios”, Bangkok, Thailand, November 11. Zweig, D. and J. Bi (2005), China’s Global Hunt for Energy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 25-38.	Keywords: China, Oil hunt in Africa, Energy polcy

IFC: Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference

Doing Business 2008: Making a Difference

Starting a business is not easy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It takes 13 procedures and 155 days—and it costs five times the annual income per capita. The situation is even worse for women: they need the consent of a husband. And if you are a single woman, a judge decides whether you can become a businesswoman.

The result: Only 18 percent of small businesses are run by women in the DRC. Next door, in Rwanda, which has no such regulations, women run more than 41 percent of small businesses.

But many countries are making it easier to do business. The Doing Business 2008 report identifies 200 reforms in 98 countries between April 2006 and June 2007.

The top reformer was Egypt. Unhappy with its Doing Business ranking last year, the Egyptian government pulled out all stops. Its efforts cut deep—with reforms in five of the 10 areas studied by the report. It made the single fastest climb in the overall rankings on the ease of doing business.

Georgia, the top reformer last year, remains in the top 10 and continues to target better rankings each year. Its efforts are paying off: Georgia is now in the top 25 countries in overall rankings for the ease of doing business. Two African countries—Ghana and Kenya—also made this year's list of the top 10 reformers.

"Overall, Doing Business has had a powerful catalytic effect," says Simeon Djankov, the lead author of the report. "For example, in the past two years, we have recorded 413 reforms in the countries we study. We have been able to confirm at least 113 instances where Doing Business inspired or informed business regulatory reforms worldwide."

The Financial Times has noted that in publishing Doing Business, the World Bank Group is "producing a public good: measurements of regulatory performance that may become as indispensable to reformers and academics as national income accounts."

Business startup and investor returns

Doing Business 2008 finds that large emerging markets are reforming fast, with the potential to benefit hundreds of millions of people. Egypt, China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam all improved in the ease of doing business.

Doing Business is also analyzing the benefits of reform. "The report shows equity returns are highest in countries that are reforming the most," said Michael Klein, World Bank/IFC Vice President for Financial and Private Sector Development. "Investors are looking for upside potential, and they find it in economies that are reforming—regardless of their starting point," he added.

By far the fastest reforms are in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which, as a region, surpassed East Asia this year in the ease of doing business. Estonia, the most business-friendly country of the former socialist bloc, ranks 17th on the ease of doing business. "The results show that as governments ease regulations for doing business, more entrepreneurs go into business," said Djankov. "Eastern Europe has witnessed a boom in new business entry, and many of the new companies are becoming global leaders, such as the Estonian-born software company Skype and the Czech car maker Skoda," he added.

Reforming business regulations benefits women

Doing Business is about studying obstacles to equal opportunity, and this year it began to look at this issue as it affects women. Initial findings indicate that higher rankings on the ease of doing business are associated with higher percentages of women among entrepreneurs and employees. Greater regulatory reform has especially large benefits for women, who often face regulations that may be aimed at protecting them but are counterproductive in effect, forcing them into the informal sector. There women have little job security and few social benefits.

The Doing Business project has committed to a two-year research program on reforms that improve the job and business opportunities for women.

Hitting the road

Doing Business does a simple but powerful thing: it systematically and objectively measures the time and cost involved in setting up, running, and closing a business in 178 countries around the world. With the publishing of the new report, the Doing Business team kicks off its annual road show visiting dozens of countries—and may be coming to a place near you.

Visit the Web site for more information on the project, to order copies of Doing Business 2008, and to generate your own reports using the latest Doing Business data: www.doingbusiness.org.

About Doing Business

A high ranking on the ease of doing business means that a government has created a regulatory environment conducive to operating a business, yet the rankings do not tell the whole story. They do not account for other factors such as the quality of infrastructure services, macroeconomic policy, proximity to large markets, or law and order.

A joint IFC-World Bank product, Doing Business is based on the efforts of more than 5,000 local experts around the world—business consultants, lawyers, accountants, government officials, and leading academics—who provide empirical input and methodological support and review.

Sociedade :TATIANA de Luanda, Finalista do 2º Big Brother Africa

October , 2007

TAKE 2 ON FRIDAY! BIG BROTHER AFRICA 2 AND THE FINALISTS ARE!

Posted by coolgal http://www.mnetafrica.com/bigbrother/task.asp

Okay here we go, Big brother africa 2 finalists are listed below. I will start with the heartbreaker Richard below.

Name: Richard Age: 24 Birthday: August 10 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Ilala Height: 1.77m Occupation: Student

If he won USD 100 000, Tanzanian housemate Richard says he’d spend it buying film equipment. The 24-year-old film student is passionate about making movies and considers filmmaker Peter Jackson as his personal inspiration. The only married contestant on Big Brother Africa 2, Richard would love to visit his wife’s hometown of Brandon in Manitoba, Canada to see “where and how she grew up”.

Name: Tatiana Age: 26 Birthday: March 31 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Luanda Height: 1.76m Occupation: Actress/model

Tatiana is a model and actress by profession. She has won two best actress awards in her own country, which is fantastic for a career that she loves and is good at. It’s no wonder then that she would love to visit Hollywood and meet actress Uma Thurman. A fan of Brazilian soapies, Tatiana relaxes by going to the beach and says audiences should watch her on Big Brother Africa 2 because she’s fun and entertaining though she admits that she has some bad habits. These include the fact that she believes she’s never wrong and she sleeps too much!

Name: Bertha Age: 28 Birthday: June 2 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Harare Height: 1.65m Occupation: Lawyer/PR and Communication Consultant

Bertha spent a year in the USA as an exchange student when she was 16 and says the experience taught her to appreciate and love her home country. “I was an ambassador, a student, and a teacher. I had to learn about my people and teach others about my heritage. That changed my view of Zimbabwe and of Africa….then began my love affair with my continent.”

Name: Code Age: 31 Birthday: June 2 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Blantyre Height: 1.74m Occupation: Broadcaster

Malawian radio personality and music man Code would love to visit Paris, likes weight lifting sometimes, enjoys reading music magazines, loves nature and wants to meet Al Gore because of Gore’s role in the Global Warming Campaign. He says that the best advice he ever got was from his father who told him to “brush your teeth and keep your breath fresh all the time.”

Name: Kwaku Age: 30 Birthday: June 1 Gender: Male Place of Birth: Kumawu Height: 1.77m Occupation: Self Employed (Entertainment Consultant, Brand Architect, Artist)

Ghana’s Kwaku says that it’s in the interest of DStv audiences to watch him on Big Brother Africa 2 because he’ll “keep them entertained.” He also says that he wanted to be on Big Brother Africa 2 because he felt he “had the winning qualities required.” A fan of Ghana’s Black Stars and self motivating literature, he says that if he could spend one day with someone famous, he’d pick Jay Z for a few simple reasons. “I admire his creativity and believe we are like-minded individuals

Name: Maureen Age: 27 Birthday: September 5 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Entebbe Height: 1.65m Occupation: Fashion Designer

Describing herself as playful, naughty and silly sometimes, Maureen says that going to India to study changed her life. She says that graduating from college in India was her best achievement because “the culture is so different from mine.”

Name: OfunnekaAge: 29 Birthday: August 9 Gender: Female Place of Birth: Jos, Plateau Height: 1.6m Occupation: Personal Assistant to Medical Director

Nigerian Big Brother Africa 2 housemate Ofunnekama is a 29-year-old Lagos resident who holds a BSC degree in Chemistry. The straight talking Ofunnekama says that the event that changed her life was the recent end of a relationship which she describes as “an eye opening experience

This show happens to be one of Naijaga's favorites and her mum too. For folks in the US, you can view hilarious clips from the show here. So who is your favorite? Alright sleep time http://naijagal.blogspot.com/2007/10/take-2-on-friday-big-brother-africa-2.html

Euvin Naidoo: Africa as an investment

About this Talk

In the talk that opened TEDGlobal 2007 ("Africa: The Next Chapter"), South African investment banker Euvin Naidoo sets the scene, framing the conversation that would unfold over the four-day event. "What's the worst thing you've heard about Africa?" he asks. After fielding call-outs of "famine," "war," "corruption," he urges the audience to move past these preconceptions -- and offers a compelling picture of a continent on the cusp of enormous change.

Speaker Euvin Naidoo: Investment banker

As president of the South African Chamber of Commerce - America, Euvin Naidoo works with leading corporations and governments to strengthen trans-Atlantic economic ties.

Why you should listen to him:

Euvin Naidoo wants to change your mind about Africa. Armed with facts, figures and a forward-looking outlook, he conveys a nuanced picture of a continent that's large, diverse and full of potential, with stabilizing economies and business growth. Speaking at TED in a personal capacity, he offers persuasive reasons why the continent's challenges should be reframed as opportunities, and why investing in Africa can make great business sense.

Based in Manhattan, Naidoo focuses on acquisition finance and private-equity transactions for emerging markets in Latin America and Africa. A third-generation South African, he spent four years as a consultant with McKinsey & Co., and holds an MBA from Harvard.

China in Africa , friend or foe for the European Union? Why Africa Matters ?

Sff ouçam um interessante diálogo entre o nosso estimado Prof. João Gomes Cravinho, SENEC de Portugal e o Director do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da RP da China, Xing Hua. Para visualizar o video , sff , clique sobre o link abaixo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPtf-WSeg24

Xing Hua , China

África uma das prioridades da presidência da União Europeia?

"Porque é África importante" foi o tema de abertura da conferência sobre este continente realizada esta semana em Bruxelas. Portugal elegeu África como uma das prioridades da presidência da União Europeia. Mas não é o único.

A China é o segundo parceiro comercial de África, logo atrás da Europa. Nospróximos dois anos, Pequim pretende conceder cinco mil milhões de euros em créditos. Mas os avultados investimentos da China geram polémica, em especial em países como o Sudão e Angola.

Xing Hua é o Sub-Director do instituto chinês de Relações Internacionais. E João Gomes Cravinho é o especialista em Segurança e Desenvolvimento e também Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação de Portugal.

Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação Professor Doutor João Gomes Cravinho

João Gomes Cravinho, 40 anos. Licenciatura e mestrado pela London School of Economics e doutoramento pela Universidade de Oxford. Professor Auxiliar da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. Docente na licenciatura em Relações Internacionais dessa Faculdade e Coordenador do Programa de Doutoramento em Política Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos. Docente convidado no ISCTE e na Universidade Nova de Lisboa. A sua tese de doutoramento versou sobre Moçambique, tendo publicado numerosos estudos académicos em revistas portuguesas e estrangeiras – Reino Unido, França, Espanha. A sua mais importante publicação em Relações Internacionais, para além de diversos artigos em revistas da especialidade, é o livro Visões do Mundo, publicado em 2002 e escrito principalmente enquanto Investigador Visitante na Universidade de Georgetown, em Washington. Para além da sua carreira académica, João Gomes Cravinho tem dedicado muitos anos de actividade à cooperação para o desenvolvimento. Foi, designadamente, consultor de entidades nacionais (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian) e internacionais (Comissão Europeia, Banco Mundial), coordenador do relatório interministerial do Governo português sobre assistência a Timor Leste em 1999, trabalhou na Presidência portuguesa da União Europeia de 2000 no âmbito da cooperação, e entre Janeiro de 2001 e Junho de 2002 foi Presidente do Instituto da Cooperação Portuguesa. Xing Hua

Remarks:	Mr. Xing enjoys the government's "distinguished contributor" specialist allowance.
Curricula vitae of the expert:
After graduating from the French Department of Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, Mr. Xing joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as interpreter, second and first secretary and political counsellor in the Department of Translation and Interpretation, and Chinese embassies in Guinea, Mauritania, Switzerland and Mali. In 1973, he joined CIIS where he took position of Deputy Director and Director of Division of European Studies and Vice President. He was a visiting scholar in the United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research (Geneva) in 1986 and Denmark Institute of international Studies in 1998. His research areas cover European situation analysis,NATO and European security, EU integration process, China-EU relations. http://www.ciis.org.cn/en/aboutus41.asp?id=50

( Vale a pena recuarmos até ao ano 2000 e lermos atentamente a entrevista do Sr. XING , abaixo, a fim de compreendermos melhor como se desenvolvem sistematicamente os três pilares da cooperação externa Chinesa) INTERVIEW WITH XING HUA Published in Autum 200o Research Fellow & Vice-President - China Institute of International Affairs (CIIS) ASEM: A STEP BY STEP PROCESS Laurent Malvezin (LM).- During the Asian Financial Crisis, there has been a lot of arguments among Europeans about the capability of Asia to recover fully from the melt-down of their economies. Today, even if the recovery has been spectacular, doubts remain as to its sustainability, and the interests of the Europeans in the area seem on the wane. Some say that the EU pay less and less attention to the opinion of Asian countries. As an expert on China and European relations, do you agree with such a view? Xing Hua (XH).- We have first to keep in mind that during the 2nd summit of ASEM, which was held in London in 1998 precisely during the crisis, European countries proved to be helpful and concerned. Not only that, they, in effect, turned their concern into concrete action, setting up the Asia-Europe Trust Fund (1), providing technical assistance to Asian countries' effort in terms of reform of other financial systems Such an attitude was very much appreciated. Of course, Asian countries realised that the world economy being more and more integrated, the Asian crisis was bound to have some impact on the European economies as well, and therefore the European Union could not ignore it. Nevertheless, European countries took a friendly posture towards the Asian countries in difficulty. This positive response somehow deepened and boosted the relationship between Asia and Europe. The Asian countries draw two lessons from the crisis: first, the necessity to improve their own industrial restructuring and to reorganise their financial system, second, the necessity to reform the international financial and monetary system. European countries can bring expertise and technical assistance, including to China, to reform our economies and financial systems. Actually, some actions have already been taken in that direction. As regards the international monetary system, the European countries and the Asian countries can cooperate together and make some proposition. But having said that, we have to take stock of the fact that some European scholars and even politicians do not necessarily share the same analysis on Asian Financial crisis with their Asian counterparts. In Europe and Asia, there is such a proverb: “ build friendship through hard times “. During painful periods of economic crisis or difficulties, the European countries should look carefully at the objective causes of such a crisis in order to take positive actions. If this is done thoroughly, it will enhance a mutual understanding of what happened. It would obviously enhance the relationship between Europe and Asia on trust basis. LM.- You mentioned the second ASEM summit as a key event in the middle of the crisis. What is the place and importance of the ASEM process in China Foreign policies ? Is it in harmony with the concept of “multi-polarization” that is at the core of the Chinese Foreign policies ? XH.- First, I would like to emphasise that the involvement of China in ASEM is not accidental nor is it motivated by tactical considerations but the logical consequence of China approach to the new international order. China is the largest developing country in the world. In the past 50 years, old China has been rejuvenated, achieving unprecedented developments since it implemented the open-door policy, especially in the last two decades. Its global national strength and its international standing have been notably enhanced and raised. The objectives of its fundamental policy are the economic construction of the country and the improvement of people's livelihood. It means, to achieve such a goal, on the foreign front, to carry out an independent foreign policy of peace, and to strive to create a sustained peaceful international environment. For that, we need to promote friendship and cooperation between the peoples of various countries in the world. Thus China is playing an ever-increasing positive role in the international cooperation. For China, to participate in international cooperation means to take part actively in the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and other International Organisations, but also to get involved in regional cooperational institutions. Why then does China take seriously the Asia-Europe relationship? Because, amongst the world’s three largest economies, namely the US, Europe and Asia, which actually means East-Asia, there was already cooperation between US-Europe and US-Asia on a bilateral basis taking place for many years through effective mechanism. And so the third pillar, Europe-Asia would be reinforced and institutionalised) Europe in the 1990’s went from being an European community to a European Union,. It has increased its economic standing in the world while the same evolution also occurred in Asia at the same time with the remarkable development of the East-Asian economies (2). Such trends have created a kind of mutual attractiveness between them and led to a common desire of deeper cooperation and relations. Moreover, the Asia-Europe rapprochement may bring additional voices in the arena of international affairs and a more impartial, balanced and stable way to manage the future of a globalized world rather than to rely on one superpower. So the whole process is in line with the concept of multi-polarization. LM.- You mentioned three economic zones, the US one, the European one and the Asian one. Do you foresee a fourth pillar such as the South American one, which stands to be different from the US one, if only because it is a Latin speaking bloc rather than an Americanised one? XH.- Indeed, and Latin America and Asia are preparing now to reach a common understanding about institutionalised economic cooperation. Later this year, one scholar of my Institute will attend an International conference on Asia-South America relations in Chile. China is deeply interested and will participate actively in the process. LM.-While everyone focuses its attention on China-Us relations, has ASEM a special meaning for China? XH.- We consider that the ASEM process aims at promoting the concept of multi-polarization, but does not constitute any kind of intention to isolate the US. As you are no doubt aware, in addition to the ASEM process, China, and the United States too, are also a member of APEC. Next year, the informal head of states summit of APEC (3) will actually take place in Shanghai. LM.- Just looking at East-Asia, along with APEC, there are other groupings such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEM, ARF, some with what is known as their track II related organisations (4). How can all these institutions can work together or simultaneously in the fields of economic cooperation or even political dialogue? XH.- From now, those who take part in ASEM are the members of ASEAN+3 (5). If East Asia represents Asia nowadays in the ASEM process, it is first because ASEAN has reached an unprecedented level of integration as a regional institution. Furthermore, the initiative of ASEM came from one of the ASEAN members: Singapore. Besides ASEAN members, three other countries of East Asia, China, Korea and Japan have, each of them, a close relationship with ASEAN members. LM.- But East Asia is not Asia, and so the Asia-Europe summit is not really true to its name. Would China welcome an enlargement of the ASEM to new members of the South Asia Subcontinent, for example, India ? XH.- Absolutely, China is ready to discuss with the members of both sides of ASEM about the possibility for new members to join the dialogue. If I’m not mistaken, India and Pakistan have already expressed their strong interest in ASEM. China is even not opposed to the entry of countries like Australia, and New Zealand as full members of ASEM, but other countries seem not ready to accept it so far. LM.- We know that in the foreseeable future, the EU members will increase, and maybe reach 25 or even more. Can an ASEM with 30 members on the one side and 10 members on the other still work in a balanced way? XH.- We have to negotiate together whether it is possible to reach a consensus on it. Of course, we have to bear in mind that, even now, there are 15 European members, for 10 Asian members, and somehow, a kind of balanced must be maintained in the future. LM.- A question that a lot of people have often in mind when they talk about EU and Asia relationship, is the vision of an European integration model for Asia. Do you think that Asian Countries in their own Institution-building process can use the so-called European experience as a benchmark ? XH.- All Asian countries agree that the EU experiment is a unique experience. As a major regional bloc, It has the highest level of integration, the strongest economic power, and has won the respect of Asian countries. But, here we have maybe to distinguish two different aspects of the question. The first aspect deals with each side sharing views from their own experience - the Integration process for the EU, and the regional economic cooperation for Asia. And the second aspect or vision consists in asking if the European model is applicable for Asian countries in their economic cooperation and integration process. I think that the former is possible and feasible, but the latter rather unrealistic. Actually, Europe and Asia have a different history and their present situation each have their own specifics. Perhaps the most relevant point is that the two regions, Asia and Europe, through the EU and ASEAN, are not at the same stage of development, and therefore, for instance, ASEAN integration is built on bilateral and multilateral state-to-state cooperation, rather than purely integration. Moreover, the so-called “European model” is not conceptually or practically as clear as it appears at first glance. Amongst EU members, there are many different views that do not necessarily reflect a unique model or projection of this model. Some countries want to promote the idea of a federal system, while others stand for enhancing cooperation between the sovereign states. In that extent, what is the reality of the “European model” ? And secondly, I would have to say that in order to effectively get mutual confidence in cooperation, for both sides, maybe European countries should refrain from acting as a teacher vis-à-vis their Asian partners. The climate would be healthier and the cooperation become more efficient and sustainable if they would discard such a naive attitude. LM.- Do you have the feeling that sometimes European countries behave like some sort of a paternalistic superpower? XH.- I would rather express this idea in a more simple way. Yes, it is true, sometimes, among some European scholars as well as politicians, there is the syndrome of the medicine man, which consists in decreeing why and where Asia is suffering from and how to deal with it. Perhaps, before delivering the prescription, European people should be better informed of the realities of Asian countries, their idiosyncrasies and constraints. LM.- Let us come back to ASEM process. There are three “pillars”, as fundamental areas of cooperation and dialogue: the economic and financial pillars, the political pillar and the intellectual and cultural pillar. In these three domains, what can be done and should be done to give ASEM some new impetus? XH.- First, let me say that China is an active member at every level of the dialogue, from state leader summits to the second track activities, and their associated working groups dealing with specific research fields. For example, a Sciences and Technologies Ministers meeting was held in China. Regarding the three pillars of the dialogue, the stand of China is very clear and highlights the importance of each of them. The economic cooperation must lead to create a better economic environment, a sustainable development and the basis for cooperation in other field of activities. Here I would say two words about the political pillar or dialogue. It is a fact that in some areas, such as the notion of security, moral values, development policies, Europe and Asia do have different ways of thinking, or even disagree on such notions. China on this crucial question advocate a step-by-step approach based on mutual respect. China’s understanding of the political dialogue broadly covers many area of research and cooperation: illegal migrations, drugs enforcement, international organised crime etc.. © www.asian-affairs.com Notes: 1.- Responding to the economic and financial crisis in Asia, the London Summit in 1998 held a discussion on the crisis and its implication for Asia-Europe relations. Heads of government pledged to keep markets open in the face of any protectionist pressures which might arise from the crisis (the ASEM Trade and Investment Pledge), and agreed to launch an ASEM Trust Fund to provide technical expertise to address the financial and social issues arising from the crisis. They also agreed to establish a European Financial Expertise Network (EFEX) to identify high-level expertise in both the public and private sectors to provide assistance to Asia. 2.- Asian ASEM partners represent 31.5% of the world population, produce 18,9% of world GDP, account for 24% of world wide exports of goods (15.9% of services) and for 17.5% of world imports of goods (22.5% of services). They generate 7.5% of FDI outflows while absorbing 14.5% of FDI inflows (Data 1998). 3.- see Asian Affairs on Asean, avaiable on the website. 4. See organization chart in this issue. 5. In 1996, when ASEM was established, as it was an ASEAN-Europe initiative, the membership seemed a straight forward one. It was bound to be the ASEAN members plus China, Japan and Korea on one side (as the Asia part on it) and the European countries which were EU members. However, ASEAN expended faster than EU did. Since ASEM II, ASEAN has become a ten countries organization among which Myanmar which is unacceptable to some EU countries as a member of the Asian community (see S. Jayakumar about ASEM). Published in Autum 2000

"Why Africa Matters" was the opening theme of a two-day conference held in Brussels this week. Portugal has made Africa a key priority during its EU presidency. But it's not the only one. China is Africa's second biggest trading partner after the EU. In this edition of Agora, two experts offer their views on why China will play an increasingly important role in shaping the continent's future.

Spring Meetings 2007: Joint Call for More Resources for Africa

WASHINGTON, April 14, 2007 - The heads of the World Bank and African Development Bank and the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid joined forces Saturday night in calling for more resources for Africa.

Louis Michel, the EC Commissioner, Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank and Paul Wolfowitz, World Bank President made the call after talks during the Bank/IMF's Spring Meetings.

Paul Wolfowitz said the meeting underlined the key message of this weekend's Bank/IMF Spring Meetings - that Africa was at a turning point.

“There are a growing number of African countries who've been doing what we've been asking them to do and its time now for the donors to step up and give them the resources that they need and that has been promised to them,” Wolfowitz said.

Speaking after the meeting, Louis Michel said the people of Africa were waiting for “progress and prosperity.”

The President of the African Development Bank said now was “an extremely important time for Africa.”

“Africa is making progress and we would like to maintain the momentum and it is time to re-double our efforts in that area,” Kaberuka said.

Michel said the talks centered on planning for boosting and focusing on priorities for Africa.

“I was also very happy to thank Paul Wolfowitz for the very strong partnership we had in the Democratic Republic of Congo. We went together to engage a lot of money before the end of the year to show the dividends of peace and of cooling down the situation in Congo - which is really promising.”

Michel said the three sides had “all to make good use of the Development Committee” (the policy making body of the Bank and IMF) to push for Africa.

Kaberuka said the main item on the agenda for the Spring Meetings was Africa and the Bank's Africa Action.

“I commend the Africa Action Plan which Paul Wolfowitz has presented. It shows all the priorities and we want to stay focused on this issue, which matters for Africa,” he said.

Rapidinhas :Sub-Saharan Africa

Burundi

Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza has said his government would not meet new demands from the country's last rebel group, accusing them of failing to keep a ceasefire deal. The Hutu Forces for National Liberation (FNL) signed a peace agreement with the government in September after a South African-led mediation. But the FNL last week stopped participating in a ceasefire monitoring team, arguing that government forces had not been withdrawn from areas under their control. (Reuters)

Central African Republic (CAR)

The CAR plans to issue a bond on a new regional bourse later this year to help raise funds to boost its ailing economy and curb insecurity, Prime Minister Elie Dote said in an interview. Current information suggests the Central African state needs around USD 1 billion to ensure security and peace and drive its economic development, he said. (Reuters)

Chad

UNHCR and its partners are dealing with a new wave of displacement in south-eastern Chad following a deadly attack at the weekend against the villages of Tiero and Marena. Preliminary reports by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies indicate that since Saturday's attack between 2,000 and 3,000 people have arrived at the Goz Amir refugee camp near the town of Koukou, which is located about 45 km east of the two villages. The camp is home to more than 19,000 Sudanese refugees from the neighboring Darfur region. (UN News)

Guinea

Guinea's president has named a new government, a month after appointing a consensus prime minister to end a series of crippling strikes. Lansana Conte's decree was announced in a television broadcast to the West African nation, following consultations with Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate. More 100 people were killed during a seven-week period of unrest earlier this year in the country. Most were shot by Guinea's security forces. (BBC)

Ethiopia

Ethiopian soldiers have killed 23 Eritrean-backed rebels, captured 18, and received the surrender of 112 more, the state news agency ENA said April 3. "The 23 rebels engaged in proxy war coordinated by the Eritrean government were killed in gunfire with the army in Armacheo district of the northern Gondar region," ENA said, quoting a regional official. Ethiopia, the major military power in the Horn of Africa, has frequently accused Eritrea of backing, arming and harboring a variety of insurgents. (Reuters)

Kenya

The lives of many Kenyans are being transformed by an innovative mobile phone money transfer service. The free account - M-Pesa - is offered by Safaricom Kenya, a leading mobile phone service operator and is a technological breakthrough say the operators. It enables subscribers to send large volumes of money in an instant transaction. Statistics show USD 93 billion in remittances is sent by migrants overseas to Africa each year and M-Pesa hopes to tap into this transfer of funds. (BBC)

Madagascar

As the sixth mayor cyclone to hit Madagascar this season tears across the northeast of the impoverished Indian ocean island, a relentless succession of natural disasters has left nearly half a million people in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Tropical cyclone Jaya made landfall on Madagascar's northeastern coast today on a projected trajectory that will see it rage through areas already devastated by cyclone Indlala just over two weeks ago. (IRIN)

Nigeria

Nigeria's electoral body has been told to allow Vice-President Atiku Abubakar to run for president in April's poll. Abubakar was indicted for graft by a government ministerial panel which investigated corruption in an oil fund. But the Federal High Court in Abuja ruled the electoral body lacked the power to exclude Abubakar from the election, in contradiction to a ruling made hours earlier by a superior court which said the electoral body could disqualify candidates. (BBC)

Rwanda

European countries should put on trial 37 suspects of the 1994 Rwandan genocide who are living in Europe, human rights groups said April 3. They accused France and Belgium, among others, of giving the suspects safe haven. Speaking ahead of the 13th anniversary of the genocide, when 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus were butchered in 100 days of state-sponsored killings, rights group REDRESS and the International Federation for Human Rights said delays in putting suspects on trial were inexcusable. (Reuters)

Somalia

Mogadishu residents buried their dead and ventured onto streets for the first time in five days April 2 during a lull in battles pitting Ethiopian and Somali troops against Islamist insurgents and clan militia. But even as elders from the dominant Hawiye clan insisted a truce was in place, hundreds of Ethiopian reinforcements drove into Mogadishu from other parts of Somalia, witnesses said. The UN said 47,000 Somalis have fled Mogadishu in the last 10 days, making a total of 96,000 since February. (Reuters)

Sudan

Unidentified gunmen killed five African Union peacekeepers in the Darfur region of western Sudan, the deadliest single attack against the force since late 2004, the AU said April 2. The five were guarding a water point near the border with Chad when they came under fire on Sunday. Three gunmen were also killed, he said. AU Commission chairman Alpha Oumar Konare warned that continued violence raised the possibility "for a catastrophic and tragic breakdown of the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur." (Reuters)

Uganda

Sixty-six children were killed in eastern Uganda during an army operation against suspected cattle rustlers, UK charity Save the Children says. They were shot by soldiers, run over by armored vehicles or crushed by stampeding animals last month. The aid group said it had not found physical evidence of the alleged deaths in Karamoja, but had consistent reports after interviewing some 200 people. (BBC)

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai has called on South Africa's leader to act quickly and decisively to halt political violence in his country. President Thabo Mbeki was appointed to mediate between Zimbabwe's government and the opposition party of Tsvangirai, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Tsvangirai said he felt threatened by President Robert Mugabe. (BBC)